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Chapter 5. 
 
 
Ins and Outs of the Dutch Life-course Savings Scheme 
Lei Delsen1 
In Europe, creating diversity and extending workers’ freedom of choice is a policy 
argument of increasing importance. On 1 January 2006 an individual voluntary 
Life-course Savings Scheme for employees (Levensloopregeling), unique in Europe, was 
introduced in the Netherlands. This chapter reviews the background, the aims and the 
ingredients of this new system, confronts expected results with actual results, and pictures 
future prospects. 
                                                    
1. Institute for Management Research, Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University, 
P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK, Nijmegen, Netherlands. 
134 – CHAPTER 5. INS AND OUTS OF THE DUTCH LIFE-COURSE SAVINGS SCHEME 
 
 
MODERNISING SOCIAL POLICY FOR THE NEW LIFE COURSE – ISBN 978-92-64-04126-4 © OECD 2007 
1. Introduction 
In Europe, extending workers’ freedom of choice over their working hours is a policy 
argument of increasing importance. Surveys in Europe indicate a clear interest of 
employees in greater flexibility and control over their working hours. Recent legislation 
in the European Union and at national level, together with initiatives developed by 
employers, unions and governments, are in favour of providing employees with more 
choices over their working time (Bettio et al., 1998; Hogarth et al., 2000; Latta and 
O’Conghaille, 2000; Webster, 2001; European Foundation, 2003, 2005; Anxo and 
Boulin, 2006). More “time sovereignty” makes it possible for employees to organise their 
working time more in line with their individual needs and interests. Part-time 
employment plays an important role in combining working, training and care 
responsibilities in the various phases of the life cycle. On balance this will increase both 
the quantity and the quality of labour supply and safeguard an adaptable labour force 
generating substantial productivity growth (Delsen, 1995 and 1998; Bovenberg, 2005). 
On 1 January 2006 the Dutch government introduced a new and for Europe unique 
individual voluntary life-course plan: the Life-course Savings Scheme 
(Levensloopregeling).2 The scheme offers employees the opportunity to save funds to 
finance periods of unpaid leave. The system is fiscally facilitated. The Dutch Life-course 
Savings Scheme (LCSS) is based on the holistic life-cycle approach (Heinz and Marshall, 
2003) and lends shape to individualisation, to tailor-made employment conditions. The 
scheme also fits the transitional labour markets approach (Schmid, 2006). 
This paper reviews the major ins and out of the LCSS and is structured as follows. In 
Section 2 the background, aims and ingredients of the Dutch life-course plan are pictured. 
In Section 3 an overview is presented of the expected results prior to introduction of the 
scheme and a number of hypotheses are formulated concerning the expected results. 
Section 4 addresses the actual participation in 2006. In Section 5 conclusions are drawn 
and future prospects of the LCSS are pictured. 
2.  Background and ingredients of the Dutch Life-course Savings Scheme 
In the Netherlands, the male breadwinner model is losing ground. There is a clear 
shift from one-earner households towards two-earner households and towards 
single-person households. It is better to talk about one-and-a-half-earner households, 
because the wives of a lot of breadwinners are working part-time and spend the remaining 
hours on care. This shift not only means more income at the household level, but also 
changes in preferences in relation to work and working hours, for example a greater need 
for part-time employment and more control over working hours (Delsen, 2002, 
pp. 47-48). The traditional three phased course of life has changed into a five phased 
life course (SZW, 2002; Bovenberg, 2005). The first phase of early youth concerns 
socialisation, learning and receiving care (0-15 years old). The second phase is new: the 
phase of young adulthood situated roughly between 15 and 30 years of age. Young adults 
experience with relationships and jobs and only have few care responsibilities. The third 
phase – the peak hour of life – combines work, care and to some extent continued 
                                                    
2. In the European Union, only the Belgian Career Break System offers a similar right for all employees to 
full-time or part-time leave (Román et al., 2006). 
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learning, and is the family season between 30 and 60-65 years of age. Financial and time 
pressures are high in this third phase. The fourth phase roughly between 60-65 
and 75-80 years old is mainly a phase of leisure (active old age) and in the final 
fifth phase of life people suffer from serious health problem and receive more intensive 
care. The new LCSS that increases the freedom of choice of employees concerning the 
spread of activities over the life course is an answer to these developments. Two effects 
are expected from the LCSS by the Dutch government (Keuzenkamp, 2004, p. 15): 
1. Generally combining tasks will be easier and notably the “rush hour of life” less 
hectic. 
2. Employment participation will increase, fewer people will stop working because 
of care tasks, and people will work more years before retirement. 
The LCSS also represents recognition by the Dutch government of the social costs 
accompanied by a policy to increase labour participation of partners. Box 6.1 summarises 
the LCSS. 
Box 5.1. Ingredients of the Dutch Life-course Savings Scheme 
• Employees have a legal right to participate in the LCSS. 
• Employees may save a maximum of 12% of gross salary per annum income tax free to finance periods 
of unpaid leave for various purposes; the maximum saving amounts 210% of the last earned gross 
salary. 
• Under certain conditions employers are allowed to contribute to an employee savings. 
• Taking leave is only possible during employment. 
• Taking leave is not a right; leave can only be taken in consultation with the employer. This does not 
apply to parental leave and long-term care leave, which are provided by law. 
• Contributions to and returns on the savings fund are tax free. Taxation is deferred until the time when 
the saving is drawn down. There is no minimum savings amount requirement for tax relief.  
• Employees receive a tax credit of EUR 185 per year of participation in the LCSS when taking up leave, 
independent of the annual contribution made. 
• Employees who participate in the LCSS and who take up unpaid parental leave, receive an additional 
tax credit equal to 50% of the gross minimum wage per unpaid day of leave. 
• Participation in both the Salary Savings Scheme (Spaarloonregeling) and the LCSS in the same 
calendar year are not permitted. 
The LCSS requires employees to take personal responsibility for the funding of 
longer periods of unpaid leave. The LCSS offers employees the opportunity to save funds 
to finance periods of unpaid leave for various purposes, such as caring for children or ill 
parents, education leave, travelling, sabbatical or (partial) early retirement, while 
continuing the original employment relationship. The basic idea is that people can reserve 
a portion of their income to offset losses of income in the future. It is assumed that 
employees are able to estimate their future needs for leave and have good insight in the 
pros and cons of the use of the LCSS. Employees are allowed to save a maximum of 12% 
of their gross wage per annum, up to an accumulated maximum amount of 210% of their 
latest annual gross wage. This means, that after saving 12% over 17.5 years, the 
maximum saving account is reached (17.5 x 12 = 210%). This period may be shorter 
because of returns on the accumulated fund. Holidays and compensation days can also be 
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“cashed in” and added to the savings. If a worker takes a leave, he/she can subsequently 
build up a full balance again upon returning to work. As employees have a legal right to 
participate in the LCSS, all employers have to offer such a scheme. Taking leave is only 
possible during employment; it is not a right and can only be taken in consultation with 
the employer. This does not apply to parental leave (13 weeks for father and mother) and 
long-term care leave (six weeks full time), which are provided by law. It is assumed that 
employers are willing to honour the wishes of employees at different moments of their 
life course. If employees do not use the accumulated credits during their working career, 
these credits will be added to their old age pension. Under certain conditions, employers 
are allowed to contribute to the employee savings. Employers may not stipulate extra 
conditions for taking up leave and contributions must also apply to employees who do not 
participate in the LCSS. 
Initially, the proposed life-course plan by the government focussed on the rush hour 
of life. The introduction of the LCSS is closely related to the abolishment of the fiscal 
facilitation of early retirement (VUT) and the pre-pension arrangements to increase the 
labour market participation of older employees. As a result, VUT and pre-pension plans 
were expected to disappear. However, the trade unions opposed. A compromise was 
worked out, including an increase in the maximum savings amount, the introduction of 
(partial) early retirement as an option within the LCSS and the relaxation of the 
transitional arrangements by the government. Accrued rights will be honoured. The 
premia paid into the early retirement funds or pre-pension funds may be used for 
the LCSS. 
As of 1 January, 2006, following the law on fiscal treatment of early retirement and 
introduction of the Life-course Savings Scheme (Wet aanpassing fiscale behandeling 
VUT/prepensioen en introductie levensloopregeling), tax deductions for early retirement 
schemes were abolished for people who were younger than 57 years of age on 1 January 
2005. Employees who were aged 57 or over on 1 January 2005 will remain entitled to 
current tax benefits and may continue to participate – fiscally facilitated – in the early 
retirement or pre-pension schemes offered by their employers. If the employer does not 
offer these schemes, this group may participate in the LCSS and save up to 12% of gross 
salary per annum. In addition a transitional regulation is applicable to employees 
between 50 and 57 years on 1 January 2005. The maximum savings limit of 12% per 
annum does not apply to this group, thus enabling them to save 210% of their last gross 
salary in a shorter period of time and build up their pension more quickly by contributing 
up to maximum amount. 
State support of the LCSS is limited to fiscal support. The contributions to the savings 
fund are tax free. Taxation is deferred until the time when the saving is drawn down. 
This delayed taxation is called the “reversal rule”. Also the returns on the fund are 
untaxed. Moreover, the LCSS is supported by a number of tax deductions. When taking 
up leave, employees receive a tax credit of EUR 185 (in 2006; for 2007 the amount is 
EUR 188) for each year in which money was paid into the LCSS, independent of the 
annual contribution made. For employees who participate in the LCSS and who take up 
unpaid parental leave, an additional tax discount applies, equal to 50% of the gross 
minimum wage per unpaid day of leave. In 2006 this is about EUR 30 per day for a 
full-timer taking full-time parental leave. According to Bovenberg (2005) the tax 
favoured LCSS can be viewed as a self-insurance device against unemployment risk and 
human capital risk over the life cycle. If individual bear financial responsibility for their 
own employability they face a better incentive to work and train than under regular 
unemployment insurance. 
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In the Budget Memorandum 2003 the Dutch cabinet announced to abolish the Salary 
Savings Scheme (Spaarloonregeling) by 2003 and proposed a new Life-course Savings 
Scheme. The voluntary Salary Savings Scheme (SSS) introduced in 1994 offers the 
opportunity of saving the maximum of EUR 613 per annum, tax-free. The savings 
amount has to remain with the bank for four years. For specified purposed it can be 
withdrawn within this four years’ period, for instance to buy a house or to conclude an 
annuity. After four years, the saved amount can be cashed in tax-free and used to pay for 
a variety of things. The original aim of the SSS was to stimulate capital formation, 
i.e. building up financial assets by the lower paid employees and to create flexibility in 
the wage formation and collective labour agreement negotiations. However, all income 
groups, notably the higher income groups, benefit from the fiscal facilitation (De Mooij 
and Stevens, 2002). There was social resistance against the abolition of the SSS. 
A compromise was made: participation in both the new LCSS and the existing SSS in the 
same calendar year is not permitted. Employees can choose each year again between 
saving through the SSS or through the LCSS. Initially the last date for choosing one of 
the two schemes was set on 31 December 2005; however, to offer extra time to make a 
choice it was decided that employees have the opportunity of making a choice until 
1 July, 2006. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has launched an extensive 
publicity campaign to promote the new LCSS and a special internet site has been set up to 
help people calculate how much they have saved towards taking unpaid leave. 
The LCSS can be covered in collective bargaining agreements. For instance, 
the LCSS will be integrated as an option into the collective agreement à la carte in the 
Dutch universities. In some of the collective labour agreements conditions related to the 
right to take leave (duration) and criteria for refusal of taking leave by the employer are 
stipulated. Another issue addressed in the collective labour agreements is the choice of 
the provider of the LCSS. Banks, insurance companies and subsidiaries of pension funds 
may offer the personal life-course saving product. The latter may be a banking product 
(savings account or investment product) or an insurance product (in most cases it will be 
a life insurance). The social partners can make collective arrangements with banks or 
insurance companies in the collective labour agreements. These collective agreements 
will not be mandatory for workers. They are allowed to shop around for a better deal or 
choose not to participate at all. Dutch trade union confederations FNV and CNV are in 
favour of a collective scheme with subsidiaries of pension funds. Some collective labour 
agreements address the employer contribution to the individual savings.3 
3.  Expected results 
In 2004 the Dutch government expected that the average annual participation in 
the LCSS will increase from 1.9 million employees in 2006 to 3.0 million employees in 
2009. This corresponds with a participation rate of 20 and 33% of the employed labour force 
(Tweede Kamer, 2004, p. 12). Also survey research by insurer Avéro Achmea and by the 
Dutch trade union confederation FNV (among young people) found expected participation 
of one third of the respondents (cited in Groot and Korteweg, 2005a, p. 10). Research by 
insurer Interpolis shows that 3% of the employees will certainly participate, while 23% will 
probably participate in the LCSS (cited in Groot and Korteweg, 2005b, p. 3). 
                                                    
3. For example, in 2006 most public sector collective labour agreements included employers’ contribution. 
The agreed employer’s contribution varied between 0.45% and 1.5% of the gross annual salary. 
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There are theoretical and empirical grounds to expect that the actual participation will 
be lower than expected by the Dutch government, that only certain groups of employees 
will participate in the LCSS, and that the scheme is only used for specific purposes. 
Survey research may suffer from selection bias because potential participants having a 
higher response rate than non-participants. The SSS is fiscally more advantageous than 
the LCSS (Goudswaard and Caminada, 2006; Keuzenkamp, 2004).4 Jongen and Kooiman 
(2004) have estimated that because of this, the take up rate of the LCSS will be low; only 
about 17 000 employees (0.1% of the workforce) will participate. Also the employer’s 
permission for taking leave makes the scheme unattractive; employees have no guarantee 
to be able to take leave in the future. Moreover, in the long run, the government may 
change the conditions. In this respect the SSS is more certain and hence more attractive 
than the LCSS. From this we expect that the number of people that will switch from 
participating in the SSS to the LCSS will be limited. Participating employees who wish to 
take up leave, but do not get permission from their employer are “forced” to use 
the LCSS to retire early. Dutch employees are very much in favour of early retirement. 
Taking into account the steep age-wage profiles with wages above productivity level at 
older age, employers will only approve when there is economic gain in allowing taking 
up saved leave, representing an additional incentive to use the scheme for early 
retirement. This tendency is emphasised by adverse selection resulting from offering 
workers greater choice and thus greater sovereignty (Delsen, 2002, 2003). Due to 
budgetary constraints, only certain categories of employees can afford to materialise their 
leave and working time preferences. Especially workers who are well-off and highly 
productive are expected to be able and willing to opt for early retirement. Lower paid 
workers will have less opportunity to choose; certainly when conditions are increasingly 
individualised and made actuarially fair, like in the LCSS. The less well-off and less 
productive workers will (have to) choose for working more years. 
The individual LCSS only considers interdependencies between activities within the 
life course of a single individual. It does not consider interdependencies between 
life courses (Fredericks et al., 2005, p. 44). Related to working time and part-time work, 
it seems more informative to take the household as the basic decision-making unit rather 
than the individual. If both wife and husband are substitutes in the household production 
of commodities (Becker, 1965), one spouse’s increased labour supply to the market may 
tend to decrease the supply of labour of the other. In case both spouses are 
complementary in the consumption of household commodities they may take leave 
together. Theory cannot predict whether the spouses are substitutes or complements in 
household production and consumption (Killingsworth, 1983; Hamermesh, 2000). The 
growth in the number of female workers and in the number of Dutch households with two 
incomes (one-and-a-half-earner households) increases the financial scope to participate in 
the LCSS and partners may use the savings to retire early, to stop working, or to work 
part-time for a limited period. The LCSS may stimulate leisure time at younger age and 
reduce the income drop when taking up leave. The LCSS does not offer an incentive to 
labour participation at older age. Hence, the LCSS runs counter to the policy of 
stimulating labour participation (De Mooij and Stevens, 2002). 
Following Simon (1957) two classes of people may be distinguished: maximisers and 
satisficers. Maximisers are people who always try to select the best option from the 
                                                    
4. Korteweg et al. (2003) found that about 60% of the employees participate in the SSS. According to 
Statistics Netherlands 41% of the employees participated in the SSS in 2003 (CBS, 2005). 
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available options. Maximisers are a small minority of employees. The majority of people 
are satisficers, who simply look for a choice that is good enough. Being a satisficer may 
be rational, because of the information costs involved. As a result, most people may 
choose not to choose. Postponing decisions, choosing not to choose, is also related to the 
increase in the freedom to choose. According to the theory of framing and the theory of 
goals (Lindenberg, 2001a, 2001b), in the case of options the strive for instant satisfaction 
and a good feeling may prevail. For short-term goals are directly tight to emotions and to 
the improvement of the conditions of self and not save money for leave in the future by 
participating in the LCSS. Hence, myopia is not just a matter of information. Finally, 
because the LCSS is a new arrangement there may be an initial hesitation from the side of 
the employees to see how things work out. Also, unknown, unloved applies. Research by 
TNS/NIPO (1 June 2006) among 1 339 employed found that only 5% will participate in 
the LCSS. For 59% of the employees it was clear what the LCSS could mean for them. 
December 2005 this was 45%. From this we expect that only a small minority of the 
employees will actually participate in the scheme in 2006. 
Fiscal treatment may also be an important explanatory factor of the overall 
participation rate as well as the age, gender and salary distribution of participants in 
the LCSS. The delayed taxation (reversal rule) only offers limited tax advantage. The 
difference between the deduction applied when the savings are made and the tax charged 
at withdrawal is usually minimal and may even turn negative when there is a considerable 
increase in income. The exemption from equity tax may be considerable for high income 
earners; but lower income earners will in most cases not be able to profit from this facility 
(Goudswaard and Caminada, 2006). The flat tax credit of EUR 185 is relatively attractive 
for the lower income groups. After 15 years of participation this tax credit amounts to 
EUR 2 770. However, single persons on minimum wage pay little income taxes and 
cannot profit from this tax credit. Moreover, the absence of a minimum savings amount 
requirement may induce employees to participate while saving only a very little amount 
money annually, just to benefit from this flat tax credit, representing a deadweight loss. 
The additional tax credit of about EUR 30 per day in case of parental leave is considered 
a significant financial facilitation for people with low incomes (Fredericks et al., 2005, 
p. 43). Women and men who earn up to approximately twice the minimum wage will not 
have to pay any income tax when using the LCSS for parental leave. The scheme will still 
be unattractive to people with a low income because the tax discount is not paid while the 
saving is done. 
Dutch experience with offering choices in the collective labour agreements à la carte 
(Delsen et al., 2006) and in the individualised Salary Savings Scheme (SSS) (De Mooij 
and Stevens, 2002; CBS, 2005a) shows that the participation rates are higher for male 
relative to females, older workers relative to young workers, employees with high salary 
level relative to employees with low salary level and for full-time employees relative to 
part-time employees. In line with this experience the contribution to facilitating 
life-course choices is expected to be limited; only some employees will be able to 
participate in the LCSS (Keuzenkamp, 2004; Plantenga and Remery, 2004; Fredericks et 
al., 2005; MinBZK, 2006). It is expected that the main users will be employees on higher 
salary, men, older employees, couples without children and full-timers. These groups will 
be able to set aside money to invest in the LCSS. The LCSS mainly offers financial 
benefits for employees with a higher salary. For single parent households and young 
people who are at the start of their career it will be difficult to save money and to build up 
a substantial account. They may use it for parental leave, but have little time to save. If 
women use the scheme, they will probably use it mostly to fund parental and/or care 
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leave. As a result, they may lose the opportunity to use the credits for early retirement or 
other forms of leave. Only few men are expected to use the LCSS for parental leave; men 
will more frequently use LCSS to fund pre-pension arrangements. The time to save for 
early retirement is relatively long. It is a well established fact that the income level 
changes over the life cycle. Data for 2003 from Statistics Netherlands show that annual 
salary increases with age, with a peak in the 46-55 years category. For young people the 
income increase is strong, because they find a (better) paid job or their wages increase 
related to seniority and more experience. At older age an increasing number of people 
stop working partially or fully, as a result their average income drops. The highest 
average income is in households with a breadwinner between 50 and 55 years of age 
(CBS, 2005b). Combined with pension consciousness these data suggest that the LCSS 
will mainly be used to finance early retirement. 
The contribution of the present LCSS to the objectives of transitional labour markets 
is expected to be poor for several reasons. There is no provision that supports the use of 
leave for continuous training or for upgrading low-skilled. It is to be expected that the 
present scheme will be used mainly for compensating income loss at early retirement and 
less for other forms of leave. There are three reasons for this: first, in case of short-term 
leave (less than three months or less than one year) the SSS is more advantageous; 
second, older workers have more financial leeway to save for leave than younger 
workers; third, in existing schemes more is saved for pre-pension than for other forms of 
leave (CPB, 2004; Jongen and Kooiman, 2004). Also because employees have to save 
first, the contribution to the objectives of transitional labour markets is limited. Pressing 
needs of women for parental leave and for care leave and early retirement for men will 
prevail (Fredericks et al., 2005, pp. 45-46; Keuzenkamp, 2004). 
Also the number of hours worked have their influence on the participation in 
the LCSS. For part-time employees the financial scope to save is limited relative to full-
time employees. Because most Dutch part-time employees have voluntarily chosen the 
number of hours they usually work (Delsen, 1995; Buddelmeyer et al., 2004), their work-
life balance may be better than the ones of full-timers; they will have less need to adapt 
there working hours by participating in the LCSS. Therefore, we expect to find a lower 
participation rate among part-timers than among full-timers. For the same reasons – 
because in the Netherlands most part-timers are female and most full-timers are male –
 we also expect the participation rate among female employees to be lower than among 
male employees. The choices made most likely also are influenced by care 
responsibilities. As care responsibilities in the Netherlands (as elsewhere) are still 
primarily a female domain, their influence will most likely be reflected in the (expected) 
lower participation rates in the LCSS by women. From this we expect the contribution of 
the LCSS to improved work-life balances to be limited. 
4. Actual participation 
Survey data show that mid-June 2006 in the government sector (6%) the participation 
rate was higher than in the private sector (5%). Most employees in the government sector 
want to use it for early retirement. The participation rate of temporary employees in 
the LCSS as well as in the SSS is about half of permanent employees. Participation 
increases with salary level and with age. Over 54% of the employees in the government 
sector participated in the SSS (MinBZK, 2006). Actual participation rates in the 
collective life-course contracts based on survey data in February 2006 for the private 
sector vary from 5% to 10%. This applies to insurers, Aegon, Delta Lloyd, 
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Nationale-Nederlanden, Reaal, as well as to banks, ABN Amro and Rabobank 
(Assurantie Magazine, 2006). 
In Table 5.1 the actual participation rates of employees in 2006 divided by selected 
characteristics are presented. The results refer to people who belong to the employed 
labour force (i.e. have a paid job of at least twelve hours a week) and have a contract of 
employment. The actual participation of 5.6% is lower than was expected on the basis of 
the stated preferences. Our expectation that only a minority of the employees will 
participate in the LCSS is supported. This does not imply that most employees are 
satisficers; it mainly suggests that only relatively few employees switched from SSS 
to LCSS. According to CBS (2007) two-thirds of the participants in the LCSS in 2006 
participated in the SSS in 2005. The limited switch is related to the fact that participation 
in the competing SSS is more interesting and less risky, and the fact that choices are more 
influenced by short-term rather than long-term considerations. With a participation rate of 
43% of employees, the SSS indeed was much more popular than the LCSS in 2006 
(CBS, 2007). As expected the participation rate of men (6.3%) is higher than of 
women (4.6%). The participation rate increases with age. The limited number of young 
adults that participate may use the LCSS for parental leave in the next phase, the rush 
hour of life. To what extent this contributes to reduced hectic depends on the available 
amount of savings and time to save. The low participation rate indicates that the 
contribution of the LCSS to a less hectic rush hour of life is limited. The results are also 
in line with our expectation that older employees have more financial leeway than young 
employees. It may also point towards the LCSS mainly being used for early retirement in 
the future. Pension consciousness plays an important role in explaining the relatively high 
participation rate of this age group, because these employees are closer to retirement age. 
Moreover, the people in this age group – borne between 01/01/1950 and 31/12/1954 – are 
allowed to save 100% of their salary per year in the LCSS as part of the transitional 
regulation. Other employees participating are only allowed to save 12%. Employees 
aged 57 and over may continue to participate in the fiscally facilitated early retirement 
and pre-pension schemes, when offered by their employer. It may be concluded that the 
design of the present LCSS does not induce employees to work more years after 
retirement; it actually is an incentive to retire early. As expected, participation rates rise 
with the education level: 8% of higher educated employees participate in the life-course 
scheme, compared with less than 4% for those with lower education levels. The expected 
adverse selection by the LCSS is confirmed. In line with our expectations, the 
participation rate increases with the number of weekly working hours; full-timers (6.4%) 
participate almost three times more than short part-timers (2.2%). The participation rate 
of employees with a permanent contract is above average. Finally, as expected, partners 
participate more than singles, and parents less than non-parents. For in individualised 
savings systems singles and parents have less opportunity (purchasing power) to 
participate. From these results it can be concluded that the contribution of LCSS to 
extending free choice of individuals to plan their life course is poor: only certain 
employees are able to participate. 
Table 5.2 shows that early retirement is the most important reason for participation in 
the LCSS for both male and female employees. Early retirement is a more important 
reason to participate among men (53.7%) than among women (44.5%). For men this was 
expected. For females this is not in line with the expectations. These results run counter to 
the aims of the LCSS. As expected the early retirement reason to participate increases 
considerably with age and applies to two thirds of the employees in the age group 
45-65 years. As expected parental leave is more important for females (10.2%) than 
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males (3.2%); at a lower level this also applies to sabbatical leave. Unlike our 
expectations parental leave is not the most important reason for females. Education leave 
is very limited as a reason for participating in the LCSS, confirming the expected poor 
contribution of LCSS to the objectives of transitional labour markets. Note, however, that 
a considerable portion of the participants (29.1%) does not yet know the purpose. Notably 
the younger employees (47.1%) have not yet decided on the purpose of the savings. 
5.  Conclusions and outlook 
The Dutch LCSS aims at increasing labour market participation of women and older 
workers. It supports combining employment and family responsibilities by enabling 
employees to cope better with stressful periods. It can be concluded that in 2006, the first 
year of operation, the LCSS was not very popular among the Dutch male and female 
employees. Actual participation is lower than expected by the government for various 
theoretical and practical reasons, including the design and fiscal facilitation, myopia, the 
fact that LCSS is a recent innovation and the more favourable competing scheme, 
the SSS. The LCSS lends shape to the individualisation; it enables an employee to vary 
his/her working time over the life cycle according his/her personal situation. Starting 
from heterogeneous employees preferences, offering options will result in high levels of 
participation and may imply that differentiation will occur. Lack of differentiation of 
actual choices and low participation rates point towards a gap between preferences and 
choices offered or that the options only match the preferences of a sub set of employees. 
Some categories of workers are not able to choose and to participate in the LCSS. 
Purchasing power turns out to be the core explaining factor. The LCSS, the fiscal 
facilitation in particular, mainly offers financial benefits for employees with a higher 
salary and explains why certain groups of employees (still) have limited opportunity to 
participate in the LCSS. The contribution to continued employment participation is 
limited, or may even be negative. The LCSS induces early retirement that conflicts with 
the aim of the scheme. Also the contribution of the present LCSS to facilitating the free 
choice of individuals to plan their life course, and to balancing the work-life balance over 
the life cycle is limited, due to the low take up rate in 2006 as well because certain 
employees are not able to participate. Investment in human capital over the life cycle is 
not addressed in the present LCSS explaining why its use to finance education leave was 
very limited in 2006 and hence why the contribution of the LCSS to the objectives of 
transitional labour markets is very poor. 
Although the LCSS performed poorly in 2006, the future of the LCSS looks bright. 
The spread of employers’ contributions to the scheme as well as the inclusion of 
the LCSS in more collective agreements à la carte will have a positive impact on the 
participation rate in the years to come. Recently announced government policy will also 
contribute to the participation rate of the LCSS. The Coalition Agreement (2007) between 
the three political parties of the present government includes plan to expand the LCSS 
and to redesign it to support continuous employment over a person’s entire working life 
(more than it does now) and to enable people to start a company, bridge the gap between 
two jobs or switch to part-time work. Moreover, in consultation with the social partners, 
the government will examine whether and, if so, how the Salary Savings Scheme (SSS) 
can be incorporated into the life-course savings scheme and be made available to 
self-employed people and business owners without personnel. Some of the shortcomings 
of the present design of the scheme mentioned in this paper will be addressed in the near 
future. Study entitlements for education and training facilities and saving towards longer 
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parental leave will be linked to the life-course savings scheme. Use of the scheme to 
finance early retirement will be geared more towards part-time retirement. People on 
lower incomes will be given better access to the scheme. Finally, the Coalition 
Agreement states that parents need to be able to combine work and care, employment and 
child-rearing in a satisfactory fashion. People in the prime of life should be able to take a 
time-out, and the LCSS scheme helps make that possible. The statutory right to parental 
leave will be lengthened from 13 to 26 weeks per employee and is non-transferable. 
The LCSS will be adapted accordingly. Not only the participation rates, also the 
effectiveness of the LCSS are expected to benefit from these announced changes in the 
design of the scheme. 
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Table 5.1. Participation rates of employees in the Dutch Life-course Savings Scheme 
by selected characteristics, 2006 
 Participation rate (%) 
Total 
Males 
Females 
 
15-25 years 
25-35 years 
35-40 years 
40-45 years 
45-50 years 
50-55 years 
55-60 years 
60-65 years 
 
Lower education 
Intermediate education 
Higher education  
 
Permanent contract and fixed hours 
Other  
 
12-19 hours per week 
20-27 hours per week 
28-34 hours per week 
35 hours or more per week 
 
Single 
Single parent 
Partner 
Partner, not parent 
5.6 
6.3 
4.6 
 
2.3 
5.3 
5.8 
6.5 
6.2 
8.3 
4.9 
1.6 
 
3.6 
4.8 
8.0 
 
6.0 
1.4 
 
2.2 
4.0 
5.9 
6.4 
 
5.2 
3.6 
6.4 
6.5 
Source: CBS (2007). 
Table 5.2. Reasons for participating in the Dutch Life-course Savings Scheme, 2006 
Percentages 
 Early 
retirement 
Parental 
leave 
Sabbatical Leave to care 
for sick relative 
Education 
leave 
Other or 
unknown 
Do not 
know yet 
Total 50.3 5.8 4.7 0.6 0.3 9.0 29.1 
Males 53.7 3.2 3.7 0.5 0.5 8.8 29.2 
Females 44.5 10.2 5.5 0.8 0 8.6 28.9 
15-25 years  29.4 5.9 5.9 0 0 11.8 47.1 
25-45 years  39.5 10.5 5.8 1.1 0.5 7.9 35.8 
45-65 years  67.9 0 2.9 0 0 10.2 17.5 
Source: CBS (2007). 
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